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Brains, tortoises and octopuses:  
post-war interpretations of mechanical intelligence on 
the BBC 
Allan Jones 
Introduction 
This article concerns the early coverage of what might be called ‘machine intelligence’ on 
BBC radio during approximately the first decade after the Second World War. This period 
saw the emergence of the first stored-programme digital computers, the birth of cybernetics, 
and the investigation brains by monitoring their electrical activity. Computers, cybernetics 
and brain research might seem to have little connection with each other, but, as I will show, 
during this period they formed a nexus for interdisciplinary discussion of machine and animal 
intelligence.  
I claim no originality for bringing together computers, cybernetics and brain research. Recent 
studies of cybernetics have explored the overlap between these three fields in the immediate 
post-War period.1 However, there are good reasons to concentrate on BBC radio in this 
period rather than, say, press coverage. In the first place, the BBC often commissioned 
presentations from the scientists, engineers, mathematicians, biologists and cyberneticists 
concerned, rather than from journalists or commentators. The broadcasts I cover were 
produced by the Talks department and would typically have been in the region of 20 minutes 
long and billed in advance in listings. Such talks were relatively plentiful (see Appendix for a 
selective list), and although hardly any audio recordings survive, many text transcripts exist 
at the BBC’s Written Archives Centre at Caversham in the UK; and some talks were 
published, albeit abridged, in the weekly BBC magazine The Listener. 
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Another reason for concentrating on the BBC is its status within British society. It attempted 
to cater for all tastes (though how successfully is debatable), enjoyed an enhanced reputation 
following the Second World War, and had no significant broadcasting competition within 
Britain. Its broadcasting activity was therefore outside the market system of mass media. This 
does not mean that the BBC was indifferent to popular tastes, but the content of its 
programmes taken as a whole could be extraordinarily wide ranging, as the present article 
demonstrates. 
Radio exceeded television in popularity at this time, although television’s popularity was 
accelerating fast during the later 1950s. Many (but by no means all) of the broadcasts 
discussed below were transmitted on the new Third Programme, a national radio network 
inaugurated in September 1946. The Third Programme supplemented two already existing 
national radio networks, the Home Service and the Light Programme (hence the name 
‘Third’), and its remit was avowedly intellectual and cultural in character. Audiences for 
broadcasts on the Third were much smaller than audiences for broadcasts on the Light and 
Home.2 
Technology 
Before looking at the broadcasts themselves, I offer some reflections on the interpretation of 
technology. Numerous socio-historical case studies have shown that during the early phases 
of a technology there is often a good deal of uncertainty about what the technology is for and 
what it signifies.3 Contemporaneous interpretations of new technologies have often differed 
from those of later commentators, who have sometimes been guilty of anachronistically 
reading present-day attitudes into the past. From such anachronisms, ‘Whig’ histories of 
technology are constructed that lead deterministically and progressively from the past to the 
present.  
A corollary of this deterministic view is a tendency to think that the meaning of a technology 
is embedded in its functional attributes. Blondheim, writing in the context of communication 
technology, expresses this idea as: 
                                               
2
 In 1949 the relative sizes of audience for the BBC’s three domestic radio networks were estimated as: Light Programme, 
60%; Home Service. 39%; Third Programme, 1%. (BBC Written Archives Centre, R6/186, General Advisory Council paper 
148, Report of a Special Subcommittee to consider Broadcasts on Science.) 
BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham, Reading, UK: R6/186 
3
 Donald MacKenzie, and Judy Wajcman, (Eds.) The Social Shaping of Technology, Maidenhead: Open University Press, 
1999. Also Carolyn Marvin, When old technologies were new : thinking about electric communication in the late nineteenth 
century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988. 
3 
....a tendency to consider media technologies as lucid and unambiguous, and to 
interpret them on their own terms.4 
The trouble with this view is that: 
[it] tends to overlook the mutability of technologies, their potential adaptation, 
transformation and reinvention in the course of their diffusion and use.5  
Among the contextual factors that bear on the form and usage of technology are: 
... state policy, law, the business environment, even other ... technologies, ... let 
alone less tangible aspects of the environment such as ideology and cultural 
patterns 6 
The virtue therefore of looking at early accounts of computers and associated technologies is 
that we see interpretations of the technology being created as the technology itself is created 
(and even before it is created).  
The multiple interpretations of emerging technologies are aspects of what Pinch and Bijker 
refer to as interpretative flexibility.7 A shared interpretation can become the marker of a 
‘relevant social group’:  
The key requirement [of a relevant social group] is that all members of a certain 
social group share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artefact.8 
In the following narrative we see particular groups and individuals alluding the new machines 
in support of particular views about the nature of intelligence and thought. 
Darwin and ACE 
One of the first broadcasts related to computers was a short talk by Sir Charles Darwin 
(grandson of the evolutionary biologist) on the Home Service on 9 November 1946, 
announcing the project to build the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) at the UK’s 
National Physical Laboratory. Other British computer projects to create a general purpose 
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computer were begun at around the same time, although none was operational until about 
two-to-four years after this broadcast announcement. 
Darwin framed the new ACE machine as a tool for mathematics, both theoretical and applied. 
Regarding the theoretical aspect, he related the ACE to a hypothetical concept Alan Turing 
had invoked in a paper published in 19379 as part of Turing’s thought experiment to solve a 
problem in mathematical logic. Turing’s hypothetical device could be programmed to 
perform any algorithmic task (i.e. a task capable of being formulated in a finite set of 
instructions, which we would now call a program). Turing did not require that any such 
machine should actually be built as part of his proof, but Darwin now alluded to it in the 
context of the new machine: 
For a long time mathematicians have been occupied in getting better logical 
foundations for their subject, and in this field, about twelve years ago, a young 
Cambridge Mathematician by name Turing, wrote a paper which appeared in one 
of the mathematical journals, in which he worked out by strict logical principles, 
how far a machine could be imagined which would imitate the processes of 
thought.10  
Darwin here gives an early characterization of computers that was to pervade much further 
discussion, namely that they were ‘electronic brains’. From the announcement of the ACE 
project and for a few years afterwards the British press had had a tendency to refer to the new 
computers as ‘brains’, or ‘electronic brains’.11 
Comparing the proposed British machine with the electronic computational devices already 
in use in the USA Darwin observed: 
We are ambitious enough to hope that we are going to get a machine which will be 
able to do more things than theirs, that in fact it will correspond to a rather higher 
level of the brain.12 
In other words, the British machine was expected to have a more sophisticated repertoire of 
operations than the American ones. Darwin gave as an example the potential of the ACE to 
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take alternative actions depending on whether the result of a calculation was, for example, 
greater than 7 or not. This modest-sounding capability turned out to engender a lot of 
discussion in later broadcasts. 
The outlines of much subsequent discussion of computers were laid out by Darwin. Firstly, 
the devices perform calculations very quickly. Secondly, there is an allusion to ‘brains’. 
Thirdly, there is the esoteric aspect: these devices in some way related to deep mathematical 
issues. Darwin even referred to the ACE machine as a realisation of Turing’s hypothetical 
machine: ‘... Turing, who is now on our staff, is showing us how to make his idea come true.’ 
There is, as yet, no suggestion of anxiety associated with these machines. They are presented 
as unproblematic tools. 
Hartree 
A month after Darwin’s broadcast, on 11 December 1946, the mathematician Douglas 
Hartree spoke on computers in the Home Service’s regular topical scientific series Science 
Survey. In the immediate prewar period Hartree had been associated with developments in 
analogue computing at Manchester University.13 Analogue computers, unlike digital 
computers, represented real-world systems physically as specially configured electrical, 
mechanical or hydraulic systems that were expected to behave analogously to the systems 
under investigation. A slide rule is a very basic form of analogue computer. Analogue 
computers arrived at answers to problems by emulation rather than calculation. At the time of 
his 1946 broadcast (and of his 1951 broadcast referred to later) Hartree was Plummer 
Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge University. 
In his 1946 Science Survey broadcast Hartree gave a lineage for the new digital computers. 
This lineage included adding machines, and the work of the nineteenth-century British 
mathematician Charles Babbage. Analogue computers were mentioned as a separate but 
related branch.14 
According to Hartree, the computing machines in development at the time of his talk, of 
which the ACE was an example, would be capable of conditional operations where the course 
taken depended on the outcome of a test on an intermediate result, such as whether it was 
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bigger than another number. He conceded that he was indulging in anthropomorphism, but 
considered it excusable: 
This faculty endows the machine with what I think is not unfair to call a limited 
amount of judgement. 15 
But Hartree objected to the term ‘electronic brain’ being attached to such machines because 
the programmer (as we would now say) had to determine in advance all the program’s 
possible courses of action. The computer’s apparent autonomy was illusory. As for the 
practical applications of computers, Hartree was clear. Their role was to do existing 
calculations quicker, or to make unfeasible calculations feasible. The possibility of entirely 
new applications was not mentioned. 
Working computers 
The three main British computers under development during the second half of the 1940s – at 
Manchester University, Cambridge University and the National Physical Laboratory, London 
– became operational within about a year of each other. Manchester University’s Mark 1 
Prototype was functioning between April 1949 and August 1950, having been developed 
from an earlier test machine. It was replaced in February 1951 by the Ferranti Mark 1. 
Cambridge University’s EDSAC (Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Computer) was 
operational in May 1949; and the ACE machine announced by Darwin was not completed 
until late 1951 (although a pilot device was operating experimentally in 1950). 16 
The appearance of these new machines in the early 1950s prompted several broadcasts 
focusing on their potential for human-like behaviour. No broadcaster claimed that that the 
existing machines could seriously be described as ‘brain-like’. The point at issue was whether 
machines of this type might one day be capable of brain-like behaviour, or whether they were 
in principle incapable of such behaviour.  
The physicist, information theorist, and reconciler of science and faith Donald MacKay did 
not think that computers of the kind being developed at this time could ever plausibly 
described as mind-like. In his 1986 Gifford Lectures, Mackay said of his outlook at this time: 
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As an analogue computer man I felt strongly convinced that the brain, whatever it 
was, was not a digital computer. I didn’t think it was an analogue computer either 
in the conventional sense. But this naturally rubbed under my skin the question: 
well, if it is not either of these, what kind of system is it?17 
In the two-part ‘Mind-like Behaviour in Machines’ (10 and 16 June 1950, Third Programme) 
MacKay, by way of demonstration of the non-brain status of the digital computer, adopted 
the tactic of explaining binary representation of numbers and the internal storage used by 
computers. This approach, by showing that computers’ fundamental operations were banal 
and elementary, was presumably intended to emphasize the mechanistic, non-human 
character of computers. However, given the prevailing ignorance of how human brains 
worked, it is unclear why this tactic should be thought to have demonstrated anything about 
the capacity of machines for thinking, or whether a similar exposition of the fundamental 
processes of the human brain would have revealed anything conclusive about the capacity of 
human brains for thought. 
MacKay considered that even when a computer performed higher-level tasks, such as 
‘choosing’ from alternative actions and deducing conclusions from premises, one should not 
be deceived: 
[Computer operations] are all mind-like activities in a sense, and it is not difficult 
to design a computer in which they are so co-ordinated that it appears to think... 18 
Implicitly MacKay makes a crucial distinction between thinking and the appearance of 
thinking. MacKay then went on to give further characterisations of computers that implicitly 
distinguished them from humans:  
Its opinions are not its own; it lacks imagination; the purposes it pursues are those 
specified by the designer; its reasoning, even if it could in principle cover a much 
wider field than that of chess, is entirely ‘black-and-white’, and takes no account of 
subtleties of meaning...19 
If it occurred to MacKay that humans sometimes display these qualities too, he did not 
mention it. His tactic for showing that computers could not be brain-like was an often used 
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one: to outline some of the fundamental mechanisms by which computers work, and to point 
to their inability to emulate certain aspects of human behaviour, such as creativity, originality 
or empathy.  
In MacKay’s second broadcast in the series, on 16 June 1950, he envisaged a type of machine 
closer to that implemented in the neural-networks used in present-day artificial intelligence. 
He spoke of a: 
...pattern of behaviour which we can define statistically in terms of probable 
reactions to given situations,20 
A machine showing such behaviour could more convincingly imitate humans, he suggested. 
MacKay envisaged this kind of behaviour being implemented at the level of the hardware, 
rather than, as in present-day artificial intelligence, at the level of the program: 
We can have gates which open only if the intensity of a signal exceeds a certain 
bias level.  We can cause the bias level to fluctuate in a random way and so for a 
given intensity of signal and range of fluctuation, we can say that the electrical bias 
is directly related to the improbability that the gate will open.21 
Thus MacKay appears to have envisaged this probabilistic behaviour as requiring an entirely 
new type of machine, different in kind from those which were coming into existence at the 
time of his talk. 
‘Automatic Calculating Machines’ and Turing 
Further computer-related broadcasts followed during 1951, notably the series of five talks on 
‘Automatic Calculating Machines’, broadcast from 5 May to 5 June and given by Douglas 
Hartree, Max Newman, Alan Turing, Freddie Williams and Maurice Wilkes.22 Apart from 
Freddie Williams (an engineer associated with the Manchester University machine), the 
speakers said little about the hardware, concentrating instead on software concepts such as 
programs, data, subroutines, and so on. They also touched on the recurring theme of what a 
computer program could and could not do in principle. There are repeated assurances about 
the inappropriateness of attributing autonomous, intelligent behaviour to computers. Hartree, 
for instance, said: 
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But do not jump to the conclusion that ... the machine is thinking for itself.  All 
these instructions for modifying other instructions, and for evaluating and using as 
the criteria of any discrimination, all have to be thought out and programmed in 
detail.  The machine only carries out literally and blindly and without thinking, the 
instructions which the programmer has thought out for it.23 
The implication here is that if the computer were to act in an unforeseeable way, one might 
be willing to concede some degree of autonomy to its activity. Max Newman, Professor of 
Mathematics at Manchester University, made a similar point in his broadcast on 8 May 1951. 
Alan Turing, though, in his broadcast, on 15 May 1951, took up this very point and disagreed 
with it. Almost a year had passed since the publication of Turing’s now famous Mind article 
in which he discussed whether computers could be said to think, and proposed the test-by-
imitation which bears his name.24 At the outset of his broadcast, Turing made his position 
clear: 
Digital computers have often been described as mechanical brains. Most scientists 
probably regard this description as a mere newspaper stunt, but some do not. One 
mathematician has expressed the opposite point of view to me rather forcefully in 
the words ‘It is commonly said that these machines are not brains, but you and I 
know that they are.’ 25 
Much of Turing’s talk amounts to a justification for regarding computers potentially as 
brains, although he was clear that existing machines, or rather the programs that ran on them, 
could not reasonably be described as such. In essence Turing argued that if the brain was a 
machine, then a machine could be a brain: 
If it is accepted that real brains, as found in animals, and in particular in men, are a 
sort of machine it will follow that our digital computer suitably programmed, will 
behave like a brain. 
What did Turing mean by ‘machine’ as applied to a brain? Turing’s biographer Andrew 
Hodges observes that Turing’s view on this, as inferred from several of his writings, was not 
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completely fixed. 26 The principal meaning of ‘mechanical’ is ‘algorithmic’, that is, operating 
according to a finite set of instructions which, in their context of use, are explicit, 
unambiguous, and capable of being performed. The new digital computers were algorithmic, 
but they were also discrete-state (that is, digital) machines engaged in computable operations. 
In discrete-state machines only certain states are possible (or, at any rate, only certain states 
matter as the intermediate states during transitions have no significance). The extent to which 
the working of human and animal brains could be likened to that of digital computers was 
unclear, but Turing held that brains must be governed by physical laws. Between 
computability and law-governed behaviour there was no obvious connection. For instance, 
might a brain, though governed by physical laws, be capable of processes that were not 
possible in principle for an algorithmic machine? As Hodges concludes: 
[Turing’s] later writings show more awareness of the problem of connecting 
computability with physical law.27 
Regarding the point made by other broadcasters – that in programming a computer all 
eventualities had to be catered for (as Hartree and Newman had pointed out in their 
broadcasts) – Turing observed that this entailed nothing about the machine’s potential for 
thinking. Planning for all eventualities, Turing observed, is not the same as knowing in 
advance what those eventualities will be: 
Certainly the machine can only do what we do order it to perform, anything else 
would be a mechanical fault. But there is no need to suppose that when we give it 
its orders we know what we are doing, what the consequences of these orders are 
going to be.28 
Andrew Hodges has suggested that Turing’s line of argument here could have been based on 
personal experiences from using the electromechanical ‘Bombes’ to help decrypt German 
Enigma-coded messages at Bletchley Park during the Second World War: 
Breaking the enigma led Turing into devising the most sophisticated algorithm ever 
used, with the ingenious parallel logic of the Bombes. Its speed of implementation 
clearly outpaced the capacities of human operators. But beyond that his advanced 
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Bayesian methods for evaluating weight of evidence showed how the application of 
rule-based methods could supersede reliance on intuitive judgment.29 
According to Wolfe Mays (a philosopher at Manchester University during the 1950s) 
Turing’s Mind article ‘set off a debate on artificial intelligence which still continues today.’30 
Mays himself gave a broadcast entitled ‘Machine Process and Thought Process’ on 5 
December 1956 which was a contribution to the debate. His opening sentence indicates, 
albeit flippantly, how the idea of a rule-following autonomous machine played to memories 
of recent totalitarian malevolence: 
I recently attended an International Congress on Cybernetics in Belgium. On the 
little yellow badge they gave us to wear there was the picture of a robot caught in 
the act of performing a goosestep.31 
His purpose, though, was not scare-mongering but to present a riposte to Turing, and to ideas 
in the developing field of cybernetics.32 Mays’s position was that what we consider as 
‘thinking’ in humans and animals was intimately associated with processes that were not 
capable of being emulated in the computing programs or cybernetic machines of his day. In 
particular, he was concerned with how prevailing ideas of machine-learning in cybernetics 
were based on a technique of reinforcing actions that were close to the desired action, as one 
might train an animal, leading to a progressive reduction of error.33 Humans and animals, 
though, displayed the phenomenon of sudden error-reduction when learning that was not 
shown by machines: 
... the errors made [by humans] during learning a task won’t always gradually 
decrease ..., but may exhibit sudden drops, as if something akin to insight had 
occurred.34 
Mays attached great weight to this distinction, but he presented the gaining of insight as a 
paradigm for learning in general. Some forms of learning, though, are not accompanied by 
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insight. For example, a diligent student of French can be expected to improve their 
knowledge of the genders of French nouns but will never exhibit the sudden reduction of 
error indicative of insight, because there is no insight to be gained into noun genders.  
Brain research 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that a standard ploy for denying machines the ability to 
think was to expose the fundamental processes of computers, on the assumption that the 
fundamental level was where one might ultimately distinguish between mechanical and non-
mechanical behaviour. Even as the new computing machines were coming into existence, 
however, brain researchers were suggesting that at the fundamental level animal brains 
appeared to be somewhat machine-like.  
In October, November and December 1950, the influential British zoologist and 
neurophysiologist John Zachary Young delivered the annual BBC Reith lectures (‘Doubt and 
Certainty in Science; a Biologist’s Reflections on the Human Brain’) on the Home Service, 
repeated a few weeks later on the Third Programme. The second lecture of the series was 
entitled ‘Brains as Machines’. Young introduced his topic as follows: 
I want here to describe the parts that makeup the nervous system and to show how 
we can speak about them by comparison with machines 35  
and in the third lecture (‘The Human Calculating Machine’) Young observed 
...it is not at all impossible that [the brain] acts like an adding machine in some 
ways.36 
Much of Young’s experimental work involved octopuses, and the sorts of behaviour they 
manifested: 
... what makes the octopus steer towards a crab but away from a shark? Some of the 
most recent calculating machines come close to making such decisions. I shall 
show in later lectures what hints we can get from the way that they do it.37 
So whereas other commentators thought decision making ability of computers gave a false 
impression of intelligence, Young thought that it offered a useful model for intelligent 
behaviour in animals. 
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Again unlike other commentators, Young did not think that invoking fundamental processes 
allowed one to conclude much about thinking ability. He commented on the dangers of 
reductive thinking when living subjects were under investigation: 
One of the most obvious ways of speaking about plants, animals and men is to 
assume that they can be investigated by dividing into parts. ... We feel that it is 
natural that if we cut up a body and look inside it we shall find what is ‘really’ 
there. ... I am an anatomist by profession and should be the last to deny this. What I 
want to criticise is the idea that by dividing and dividing one will ultimately find in 
some way the real or true unit, which gives full knowledge of the body.38  
In view of the above, Young would presumably have been unsympathetic towards attempts to 
deny machines the ability to think by reference to their fundamental processes; and also 
unsympathetic to claims that the thinking ability of brains was explicable by reference to 
their fundamental processes. For Young, such reductive approaches were valid in neither 
biology nor physics: 
Biology, like physics, has ceased to be materialist. Its basic unit is something non-
material, namely normally an organisation.39  
On this view, an ability to think would be a something like an emergent property arising from 
complex interactions between processes in the brain. However, Young was wary of 
attributing what he called ‘occult qualities’ to organisms. These were qualities that were not 
directly observable. ‘Consciousness’ was one such occult quality, and he speculated that 
psychology traded heavily in such qualities: 
May it be that the terminology of psychology consists of a series of occult 
qualities?40  
Although Young does not cite ‘thinking’ as an occult quality, it fits his description. Occult 
qualities were at best provisional forms of explanation, justifiable for their utility in the 
absence of anything better: 
[Occult qualities] are models, if you like, used for convenience of description; we 
can do without them when we get better ones. Take the case of consciousness. In 
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order to talk we postulate this entity [i.e. consciousness] as a kind of something 
within ourselves.41  
Young’s approach to intelligent behaviour in this series was thus at odds with those of several 
of the mathematicians and physical scientists. Unlike them, he saw a virtue in likening a 
brains and a computer to each other, and considered that reducing each to its fundamental 
processes did not illuminate their differences or similarities. Such reductive approaches 
eliminated the crucial issue of organisation. Young, presumably because of his biological 
background, was more inclined to take a systems view, and to see that systems could be 
similar even when their elementary components were very different. 
Cybernetics 
Another broadcaster from with a biological background in brain was the neurophysiologist 
and cyberneticist W. Grey Walter. In the mid-1930s, following the lead of other pioneers, he 
had constructed and used electroencephalographic equipment at the Maudsley Hospital in 
London.42 In 1939 he moved to the Burden institute in Bristol, and while working there he 
developed, during 1948 and 1949, the electronic ‘tortoises’ that he is mainly remembered for. 
 
One of Grey Walter’s ‘tortoises, now at the Science Museum, London. Courtesy of the Science 
Museum/Science and Society Picture Library 
The tortoises were battery-powered autonomous wheeled devices.43 The back wheels, driven 
by an electric motor, propelled the tortoise forwards, and sometimes backwards. Another 
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motor steered the tortoise by steadily turning the front wheel’s plane of rotation about a 
vertical axis, continually changing the tortoise’s direction of motion. In a free-running state, 
the tortoise progressed in ‘a kind of cycloidal wandering,’44 or in non-overlapping loops. Two 
conditions would change this behaviour. Striking an obstacle would activate a switch on the 
body of the device, resulting in the tortoise moving alternately backwards and forwards until 
free; and a source of illumination near the tortoise was detected by a photocell above the 
front wheel causing it to steer straight towards the source, although as the tortoise got near 
the source it would turn away. The tortoise’s behaviour seemed purposeful and, within a 
narrow range of activity, intelligent. 
Walter’s tortoises were not computers. Compared with the new computers they were simple 
devices, operating on entirely different principles from computers. Nevertheless, in a context 
where many people were exercised about the potential of machines for brain-like behaviour, 
the work of Grey Walter and other cyberneticists often seemed to be akin to that of the early 
computer builders. However, as Andrew Pickering points out, what the cyberneticists sought 
to emulate with their devices was not the knowledge or reasoning ability of the animal brain 
but its ability to adapt to and act within its environment.45 This is a distinctively biological 
approach to the brain. 
A few months before building his tortoises, Grey Walter gave his first radio broadcast during 
which he spoke about the devices he intended to make. His broadcast endowed the tortoises 
with many more capabilities than they turned out to have: 
In shape it would be rather like a tortoise, you could tell that it disliked cold, damp 
weather, because it would moan pitifully at temperatures below 40°, and humidities 
above 80%. What is more, it would run towards any source of warmth, but would 
avoid great heat and bright lights. In the evening, it would come out from under the 
sofa and sit by the fire, or nestle against your leg, but it would scuttle back to its 
hiding place at a loud sound or sudden movement and could only be enticed out 
again by a low whistle. 46 
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Grey Walter went on in this fanciful vein, saying the machine would register a ring at the 
door, demonstrate a preference for women over men, give intruders electric shocks, and so 
on. He referred to it as a ‘mechanical pet’, and even hinted at something like Turing’s 
imitation test: 
... when it is finished I challenge anyone to tell whether or not it is living, without 
prolonged observation.47 
In due course Grey Walter made further tortoises with additional capabilities, although none 
of them was as versatile as his broadcast claimed they would be. 
Andrew Pickering points out that despite their simplicity, the tortoise’s interactions with its 
environment was often surprising and unpredictable, although usually explicable afterwards: 
... a reductive knowledge of components does not necessarily translate into a 
predictive understanding of aggregate performance – one still has to run the 
machine [i.e. the tortoise] and find out what it will do.48 
This echoes Turing’s comment (earlier) that the programmer of a computer sometimes did 
not know what the program’s outcome would be. 
Grey Walter went on to give over 20 broadcasts for the BBC (including television and 
overseas broadcasts).  
Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, a British neurologist and neurosurgeon responded to Grey Walter in a 
Third programme broadcast on 14 September 1949, though without naming him.49 Jefferson 
was a sceptic on mechanical intelligence, and adopted the tactic of belittling Grey Walter’s 
work, whilst indulging in a degree of anthropomorphism regarding real tortoises: 
... it should be possible to construct a simple animal such as a tortoise that would 
show by its movements that it disliked bright lights, cold and damp, and be 
apparently frightened by loud noises.... [It] might cause the credulous to exclaim 
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‘This is indeed an animal’. I imagine, however, that a real tortoise would quickly 
find it a puzzling companion and a disappointing mate.50 
One might agree with everything Jefferson says and still accept that Grey Walter’s tortoises 
revealed a remarkable truth: that apparently intelligent behaviour can be created by relatively 
simple mechanisms following simple rules. 
The leading American cyberneticist at this time was Norbert Wiener. He broadcast on the 
BBC on 30 April 1951 on ‘The New Industrial Revolution’. He was the only broadcaster I 
am aware of who recognised that the new computers potentially raised social issues. The new 
machines were emerging into a world of conflicting interests and unequal distributions of 
power, and would therefore be capable of appropriation for socially contentious ends. He also 
recognised the crucial role of economics in determining how the machines would be 
exploited industrially: 
As to the cost of these machines, it will probably go down ... to the level perhaps of 
hundreds of pounds. When you consider that this is the order of price, not of the 
whole factory ... of labourers, but of the single labourer, you will see that the 
machine has a great economic argument for it 
.... factories used by a few people to make a quick fortune while [former 
employees] have no jobs. That is not a socially safe situation.51 
Conclusion 
The forgoing discussion shows that attempts to attach significance to the newly emerging 
mechanical ‘brains’ (whether computers or cybernetic machines) began even as the machines 
were under development. Naturally the fact that computers could perform complex 
calculations quickly was not itself contentious. Rather, there was a sense that these machines 
could have a significance over and above their prosaic functions, and this was related to their 
apparent autonomy and ability (in some people’s opinion) to give at least a semblance of 
intelligence. This stimulated the debates discussed here. 
I mentioned earlier concepts of interpretative flexibility and relevant social groups in relation 
to newly emerging technologies. In connection with the newly developing computers and 
cybernetics we see from the foregoing two pronounced trends in the way computers were 
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framed in popular expositions. One way is as an uncontentious tool for calculation. The other 
is as a basis for conceptual explorations of thought and intelligence. In this latter framing, the 
value of the computer lay in what it might suggest about the way humans and animals 
thought, or what the limits of artificial intelligence might be. For example, in a letter to the 
cyberneticist Ross Ashby in 1946, Alan Turing wrote: 
 ...in working on the ACE [the National Physical Laboratory computer] I am more 
interested in the possibility of producing models of the action of the brain than in 
the practical applications of computing. 52 
For cyberneticists such as Grey Walter the devices they constructed had no other purpose 
than to elucidate possible brain processes by emulating aspects of the brain. 
When we look at the backgrounds of the broadcasters, we can discern two ‘relevant social 
groups’. There were those from a background in mathematics, physics or engineering (whom 
I will refer to as physical scientists), and those from a more interdisciplinary background that 
included a strong component of biology or neurology.53 For the physical scientists such as 
Hartree, Newman and MacKay, the new computers were essentially calculating machines, 
and further speculations about their potential for thinking was fanciful and misleading. They 
argued their case reductively, by referring to the fundamental processes on which computers 
operated, and by emphasising the deterministic nature of algorithmic programs. Turing, 
though a physical scientist, was an exception. His reluctance to accept such reductive 
arguments, and his interest in the computer for modelling brain processes, aligns him more 
closely with the more biologically informed cyberneticists. (It is possibly relevant to note 
here that Turing’s last few years were devoted to computer-based biological research.) 
Similarly Geoffrey Jefferson was an exception from the neurological camp. He took a 
sceptical line on cybernetics and computers as models of brain behaviour. 
Many more BBC broadcasts related to computers and brain-like behaviour were given in the 
immediate postwar period than I have been able to discuss here, but I would contend that 
these conclusions are largely upheld when they are taken into account, though with many 
further nuances. The Appendix to this article lists the broadcasts I am aware of. 
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Appendix 
Broadcasts, 1946–56, for which texts survive 
Broadcast 
date 
Speaker Title BBC 
Service 
9 Nov. 1946 Sir Charles Darwin The Automatic Calculating Engine (news talk) Home 
11 Dec. 1946 D. R. Hartree The New Giant Calculating Machine Home 
25 Feb 1948 
 
 
28 April 1948 
W. Grey Walter 
 
 
W. Grey Walter 
Mind and Machines 
 
 
The Enchanted Loom 
West of 
England 
Home 
Third 
11, 14, 19, 21, 
26, 27 May, 1 
June 1949 
H. Dale, C. Sherrington, W. 
LeGros Clark, S. Zuckerman, 
W. Penfield, V. Samuel, A. J. 
Ayer, G. Ryle 
Physical Basis of Mind Third 
14 Sep. 1949 
26 Sept. 1949 
G. Jefferson 
S. Lilley 
The Mind of Mechanical Man 
Electronic Calculating Machines 
Third 
Overseas 
4 May 1950 W. Grey Walter Brains: Electronic and Human Home 
10 June 1950 D. M. Mackay Mind-like Behaviour in Machines: 1 
Mechanising Thought 
Third 
16 June 1950 
 
20 Oct to  
17 Dec. 1950 
D. M. Mackay 
 
J. Z. Young 
Mind-like behaviour in Machines: 2  Machines 
and the ‘Mind-body Problem’ 
Doubt and Certainty in Science 
Third 
 
Home 
3 March 1951 C. Cherry Communicating Information – Languages and 
Codes 
Third 
2 April 1951 D. M. Mackay Measuring Information Third 
30 April 1951 N. Wiener The New Industrial Revolution Third 
5 May 1951 D. R. Hartree Automatic Calculating Machines Third 
8 May 1951 M Newman Automatic Calculating Machines Third 
15 May 1951 A. M. Turing Can Digital Computers Think? 
(No. 3 of ‘Automatic Calculating Machines’) 
Third 
2 June 1951 F C Williams Automatic Calculating Machines Third 
5 June 1951 
 
1, 8, 15 Nov. 
1951 
M. V. Wilkes 
 
W. Grey Walter 
The Use of Automatic Calculating Machines 
(No. 5 of ‘Automatic Calculating Machines’) 
Patterns in Your Head 
Third 
 
Home 
14 Jan. 1952 Turing, Newman, Jefferson 
and Braithwaite 
Can Automatic Calculating Machines be Said to 
Think? 
Third 
8 May 1952 C. Strachey Control Without Men. Part 2 Calculating 
Machines and the brain. (Part 1 missing) 
Home 
7 Oct. 1954 D. M. Mackay On Comparing the Brain with Machines: Part 1 
Motives and Methods 
Third 
14 Oct. 1954 D. M. Mackay On Comparing the Brain with Machines: Part 2 
Progress and Perspective 
Third 
5 Dec. 1956 W. Mays Machine-like Processes and Thought Processes: 
The Likenesses and Differences Between 
Machines and Men 
Third 
20 
10 Dec. 1956 C. Cherry On the Present State of Brain Models Third 
12 Dec. 1956 F.H. George Machines and Human Behaviour: Reproducing 
Human Behaviour in Machines 
Third 
 
